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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUDANESE ELECTIONS

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BACKGROUND

SUDAN - CHRONOLOGY AND AGREEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT

- 1899 - Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement on joint sovereignty over Sudan following reoccupation of country by British and Egyptian forces.
- 1924 - As result of murder of General Lee Stack in Cairo, Egyptian participation in administration of Sudan severely restricted. This status maintained up to present.
- 1951 - In October 1951 nationalist Wafd-dominated Egyptian parliament "abrogated" 1899 Sudan Condominium Agreement and amended Egyptian constitution to provide for unity of Sudan with Egypt under Egyptian crown.
- Nov 1952- - Arduous Anglo-Egyptian negotiations to provide for
Feb 1953 Sudanese self-government and eventual self-determination. Terms of agreement signed 12 February 1953 provide for:

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1. A five-man commission (composed of 2 Sudanese, 1 Britisher, 1 Egyptian, and a Pakistani chairman) to advise governor general of Sudan, traditionally a British official. Governor general retains certain "reserve powers" for internal security matters and is responsible to Britain and Egypt for foreign affairs.
2. Agreement called for "early" elections to provide a 97-seat house of representatives and to elect 30 members of 50-member senate. Remaining 20 members being appointed by governor general.
3. Elections were to be carried out under supervision of an international Election Commission composed of 3 Sudanese, 1 Britisher, 1 Egyptian, 1 American and an Indian chairman.
4. Following establishment of Sudanese parliament, country will enter a "transitional period" of self-government -- not to exceed three years. "Transitional period" will be ended by Sudanese parliament passing a resolution calling for "self-determination." Elections will then be held for a Constituent

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Assembly which will decide future of Sudan -- union with Egypt
or independence -- and will draft a constitution for Sudan.

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NATIONAL UNIONIST PARTY

1. Formed in Cairo on 31 October 1952 by merger of five Sudanese pro-union political parties.
2. Party largely financed by Egyptian funds.
3. Aim--union of Sudan and Egypt.
4. Popular support drawn principally from KHATMIA, Moslem religious sect. Leader of Khatmia, Ali MIRGHANI - life-long opponent of Mahdi, who is leader of rival ANSAR sect and its political counterpart, Umma Party.
5. Mirghani may have about two million followers. Mahdi has about four million.

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UMMA PARTY

1. Political expression of Mahdi's ANSAR, Moslem religious sect.
2. Umma has cooperated with British administration in past and has stood for Sudanese independence rather than union with Egypt.
3. Umma's strength depends on individual loyalty to Mahdi as head of Ansar.
4. Mahdi in past has been suspected of seeking to become king of Sudan with British backing.
5. Umma has claimed control of 70 percent of South Sudan. Present elections did not demonstrate this claim.

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STATUS OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN BASE NEGOTIATIONS

Informal consultations in Cairo between British and Egyptian spokesmen from late July 1953 until 21 October 1953 have resulted in the following developments:

1. General Agreement on:

- a. evacuation of 70,000 British troops within 15 months after a pact is signed;
- b. retention of 4,000 British technicians at the Suez base after the evacuation; British supervision of the technicians under an Egyptian base commander; and gradual withdrawal of the technicians over a period of seven years.

2. Disagreement on two major issues:

- a. future availability of the base to Britain in the event of war;
- b. right of British technicians to wear uniforms on the base.

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On the "availability of the base" question, Britain wants the base to be automatically available (to Britain) if the UN finds there has been aggression anywhere in the world.

Egypt, however, wishes to limit the availability of the base solely to the event of an outside attack against any member of the Arab League Collective Security Pact; Egypt would be willing to consult London in the case of an attack on Turkey and Iran.

Negotiations may re-open after the British ambassador returns to Cairo in mid-December, but there is little prospect of an early agreement.

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3.
9 December 1953

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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUDANESE ELECTIONS

Decisive victory of pro-Egyptian National Unionist Party, which won 54 out of 97 seats in first but major phase of move toward Sudanese self-government, is strong slap at British administration rather than wholehearted endorsement of union with Egypt. It creates a new problem for Sudan and may complicate settlement of Suez issue.

1. British Administrative Problems

A. Election results, according to first reports from

Khartoum, have discouraged local British officials. *Foreign Office London expects possibly large number British resignations from Sudan political service*
B. Umma Party in the past has generally cooperated

with British. It only won 22 seats out of 97.

C. Umma claimed before the election that it controlled 70 percent of the population of black South. Its leaders now call fraud and threaten boycott. Election under international Election Commission reasonably honest.

D. Clear, however, that Umma failed to measure up to pre-election hopes because it is tarred with collaboration

with British

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E. Anti-British sentiment appears to have been determining factor in surprise vote which ran up to about 50 percent of eligible electorate.

F. British administration in next three years of preparation for Sudanese independence faces administrative difficulties in an area where rising tide of opposition is clearly established.

II. Egypt's Position

A. Vote, which is loudly hailed in Cairo, not really pro-union but anti-British.

B. Egypt actually created National Unity Party in October 1952 out of five smaller Sudanese parties. Gave direct moral and financial support, latter aspect fairly well hidden.

C. Egyptian leaders frequently visited Sudan before elections. General Nagib, half Sudanese, is locally popular.

D. Sudanese leaders given junket tours to Cairo.

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E. Egypt may be expected to intensify various efforts in Sudan, especially theme of British colonialism and imperialism.

F. Egypt, however, can offer little to Sudan.

1. Egyptian administrators generally bad.

2. Egypt and Sudan compete for long-fiber cotton markets of world.

3. Any Egyptian use of Sudan as population outlet would result in strong Sudanese opposition.

III. Developments Anticipated Inside Sudan

A. Sudan faces complex problems inherent in premature self-government:

1. Over 98 percent population illiterate.

2. Almost no administrative or political experience.

3. Basic division of country between Arabic-speaking Moslems of North and primitive non-Moslem black tribes of South.

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B. Parliamentary problems

1. Newly formed coalition gives no promise of furnishing needed leadership.
2. Intraparty quarrels and breakup distinct possibility.
3. Deep-seated political and religious antagonism between Ali Mirghani, top figure in National Unionist Party, and Mahdi, head of ~~the~~ Umma Party, likely to create serious friction and flare-up in public disorder.
4. Newly elected parliament certain to face hectic and confused situation.

limited { C. Heavy Egyptian propaganda on imperialism dangerous and
unknown factor.

IV. Possible Impact on Suez Dispute

A. British reaction

1. Officially in past weeks Eden twice charged Egypt with interfering in elections.
2. No official reaction as yet to election outcome.

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B. Egyptian Position

1. Egypt, under Nagib's inspiration, has publicly

stated it is ready to proceed to Suez settlement. *at present*
might possibly make some concession,

2. Unyielding British attitude will quickly result

in tough Egyptian reaction bolstered by sense of

victory in Sudan.

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